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Abstract
Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking
crises within the economy. This connection is suggested by both anecdotical and empirical
evidence. The conventional view is that the domestic financial turmoil is caused by foreign
creditors’ retaliation. Yet, there is no clear-cut evidence supporting the existence of “classic”
default penalties (e.g., trade sanctions or exclusion from international capital markets).
This paper then proposes a novel mechanism linking sovereign defaults with liquidity and
banking crises without any intervention of foreign creditors. The model considers a standard
unwillingness-to-pay problem assuming that: (i) the enforcement of private contracts is
limited and, as a result, public debt represents a source of liquidity; (ii) the government
cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign agents. In this setting, the prospect of
drying up the private sector’s liquidity restores the ex-post incentive to pay of the government
without any need to assume foreign penalties. Nonetheless, liquidity crises might arise when
economic conditions deteriorate and the government chooses opportunistically to default in
order to avoid the repayment of foreign agents. The interaction between the enforcement
friction and sovereign risk is then exploited to study the implications on international capital
flows and legal and institutional domestic reforms.
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1 Introduction
A long-standing question in the sovereign debt literature concerns the identification of the costs
associated with default. Given that sovereigns cannot be forced to honor their obligations under
existing legal arrangements (due to the jurisprudential principle of “sovereign immunity”), the
literature coincides on that the mechanism making sovereign debt possible is that countries repay
their debt to avoid the costs of default. There is no doubt, indeed, that default represents an
unappealing policy option for governments, which might precipitate the economy into protracted
growth slowdown and financial turmoil. Nevertheless, there is much less agreement on which
mechanism generates such negative outcomes. Typically, past studies have focused on “external”
cost channels as trade sanctions, borrowing restrictions or reputational issues,1 but there is no
clear-cut evidence supporting the existence of these classic penalties.2 My analysis, instead, takes
an inward perspective and proposes a novel mechanism linking sovereign defaults with liquidity
and banking crises without any intervention of foreign creditors.
This paper is motivated by both anecdotical and empirical evidence suggesting that sovereign
debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity crises and banking crises
within the economy. For example, during the Argentine crisis in 2001-2002, the temporary
suspension of debt payments by the government concurred to undermine the strength of banks’
balance sheets. With banks not granting new loans, businesses dramatically cut back on their
spending, aggravating further the economic downturn.3 Such a “domino effect” might be a latent
threat in many emerging markets, where domestic financial institutions, in particular commercial
banks, are major holders of public debt.4 As a matter of fact, Borensztein and Panizza (2008)
show that over the period 1980-2000 sovereign defaults often predicted banking crises in a wide
sample of emerging economies.5
In order to explain the connection between sovereign defaults and liquidity and banking crises,
this paper studies a standard unwillingness-to-pay problem in a setting where: (i) domestic firms
save (either directly or indirectly through the banking sector) in government bonds, which are
stored as a reserve of liquidity to finance a reinvestment made necessary by an unexpected shock;
(ii) the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign bondholders. As a con-
1See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) for a state of the art review of the literature.
2Though, the academic debate on the identification of these “classic” penalties is alive and well. Borensztein
and Panizza (2008) review past empirical studies on the cost of defaults.
3A similar analysis is made by Mishkin (2006), as reported in the appendix.
4Kumhof and Tanner (2005) report that financial institutions’ net credit to the government relative to their
total assets ranges from 20% to 40% in emerging markets, whereas this ratio is typically around 10% in advanced
countries.
5Applying a methodology similar to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) to a large sample of countries over 1975-
2000, these authors find that the probability of a banking crisis in a given year conditional on having a sovereign
default in the same year or in the year before is 14 percent, whereas the unconditional probability is only a 2
percent, and the difference between the conditional and unconditional probability is statistically significant. On
the other hand, the probability of a sovereign default conditional on a banking crisis is not statistically different
from the unconditional probability. This evidence then suggests that sovereign defaults might lead to banking
crises, while the contrary is on average not true.
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sequence of these two assumptions, the government faces a trade-off when choosing whether to
fulfill its debt obligations. Indeed, debt repayment implicitly transfers resources from domes-
tic taxpayers to both domestic bond holders (domestic firms) and foreign bond holders. The
transfer to domestic bond holders involves only a redistribution within the economy. When the
government does not care about wealth inequality, such a transfer unambiguously raises domestic
welfare since it enhances liquidity provision in the economy. On the other hand, the transfer to
foreign bond holders involves a redistribution of resources away from the economy. Given that
the government does not care about foreigners, such a transfer reduces domestic welfare.
More specifically, the model considers a small open economy that has scarce initial resources,
limited legal enforcement and suffers from a lack of collateral which limits the private provision
of liquidity (i.e., easily tradable financial securities). Domestic firms face the risk of adverse
shocks, that require an additional investment along the production process, and need to store
precautionary savings. Given that there is under-supply of private securities and no exogenous
storage technology, domestic firms save in government bonds. At the same time, the government
issues a public bond to both domestic and foreign agents in order to undertake a public investment
project. In addition, the government is a sovereign which cannot credibly commit to honor its
future obligations and cares only about domestic agents. The standard unwillingness-to-pay
problem then arises as the government has an ex-post incentive to avoid the repayment of foreign
creditors. Yet, assuming that the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign
bond holders, the repudiation of debt produces a loss of aggregate output as domestic firms
cannot reinvest in their projects. My model then shows that the prospect of drying up the
private sector’s liquidity restores the ex-post incentive to pay of the government without any
need to assume foreign penalties.
In this setting, a liquidity crisis arises when the economy experiences an adverse shock (either
an aggregate productivity shock or a terms-of-trade shock). However, the crisis is not triggered
by either currency or maturity mismatches in the government’s fiscal balance, as supposed in
past studies,6 but it is a consequence of the opportunistic behavior of the government. As the
aggregate shock lowers the returns of domestic firms on additional investment, the social cost
implied by a liquidity crisis falls below the fiscal cost required to repay the debt and so the
government announces the default. In particular, the model suggests that the occurrence of
liquidity crises induced by sovereign default is particularly likely in economies characterized by
pronounced business cycle volatility.
By highlighting a direct mechanism through which a sovereign default imposes a cost on the
domestic economy, my paper contributes to the sovereign debt literature. Since the seminal
contribution of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), the conventional view in the literature has been that
default represents an unappealing policy option for governments since it either triggers foreign
6In particular, in the Original Sin literature, as surveyed in Eichengreen et al. (2003), or in Chang and Velasco
(1999).
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retaliation, and thus exerts a negative effect on domestic production and financial activity, or has
reputational consequences.7 Only recently, and in part as a side effect of the financial turmoil
caused by the latest default episodes, more attention has been paid on direct effects on the
domestic economy. Notable contributions in this sense are Sandleris (2006) and Broner and
Ventura (2006, 2008). In particular, my paper is closely related to Broner and Ventura (2006,
2008) in assuming that the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign agents.
Different implications are however obtained. In the framework considered by these authors,
sovereign default leads to an undesirable redistribution of resources within the economy. In my
model, instead, sovereign default leads to a disruption of private investment.
My paper is also related to the work of Woodford (1990) and, in particular, Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998). These authors show that a credible and benevolent government can enhance pri-
vate liquidity provision by issuing a public bond. Indeed, the government can expand the supply
of liquidity (i.e., easily tradable financial securities) thanks to its assumed ability to commit
agents’ future income through taxation.8 Nevertheless, Holmstrom and Tirole’s argument de-
pends crucially on the assumption that the economy is closed, and so domestic firms cannot
store liquidity by saving abroad. Indeed, when there are no restrictions on international capital
flows and the government commits to repay in the future, the interest rate on government bond
is set by the world interest rate and entrepreneurs are indifferent between saving in the domestic
public debt or saving abroad. In other words, international capital markets provide the economy
with sufficient supply of liquidity and reduce the need for government intervention. Nevertheless,
my model shows that Holmstrom and Tirole’s argument can be restored in an open economy
setting by simply relaxing the assumption of credible government commitment considered by
these authors. In particular, it is possible to show that the absence of commitment generates a
contingent repayment policy by the government and, as a result, government debt becomes an
imperfectly substitutable source of liquidity for the economy.
Finally, by relaxing the perfect commitment assumption, it is also possible to study in a non
trivial way the incentive of the government to improve domestic regulation. In particular, a better
rule of law induces a substitution between precautionary savings in non-contingent government
bonds to contingent forms of insurance. Yet, as domestic firms don’t need anymore to save in
government bond, the sovereign risk problem reappears restricting the government’s access to
foreign lending. My model then describes the economic conditions that lead the government
to improve regulation. In particular, it is shown that the government’s incentive to undertake
7See in addition, Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Fernandez and Rosenthal
(1990), Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Wright (2002), Amador (2004), Yue (2005), Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008), among others. See Eaton and Ferna´ndez (1995) and Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2006) for two excellent surveys of the sovereign debt literature.
8The issue of optimal liquidity provision has been extensively analyzed by past literature. A partial list of past
contributions include Reinhart et al. (2000),Allen and Gale (2004), Kumhof (2004), Taddei (2004), Gorton and
Huang (2004), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008). In particular, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) push
this argument farther and show that the government intervention can also improve efficiency in the use of private
collateral.
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a legal reform is positively related to the average return on private investment and negatively
to the return on public investment. The model then suggests a possible explanation for cross-
country and cross-time variation in legal institutions which differs from studies stressing political
economy issues, as for example Rajan and Zingales (2003) and references therein.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a baseline model of government
debt as a source of liquidity. Section 3 introduces sovereign risk in this setup and analyzes the
mechanism leading to liquidity crises. Section 4 discusses the model implications on institu-
tional and political reforms. Section 5 presents a cross-country, cross-industry evidence that is
suggestive of the mechanism emphasized by the paper. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 A model of government debt as a source of liquidity
In this section I set up the environment of the economy. The model highlights: (i) the problem
of domestic entrepreneurs (firms), who start a long-term investment facing the risk of a shock on
total costs (expenditure shock) before completion; (ii) the problem of a benevolent government,
who chooses public debt issuance in order to finance a public investment project. As a con-
sequence of capital market imperfections, domestic firms save in government bonds to hoard a
reserve of liquidity against the future shock. This setup will be enriched by introducing sovereign
risk in section 3, in order to study the connection between sovereign default and liquidity and
banking crises.
2.1 Environment
Consider a small open economy lasting for three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. In this economy there
are only two goods: a private good, that can be used for consumption and investment, and a
public good, that can be used only for cosumption. The economy is inhabited by three types of
agents: a continuum (with mass one) of entrepreneurs, a continuum (with mass one) of workers
and a government. Both entrepreneurs and workers are competitive and risk neutral, consume
only at date 2 and their preferences are described by the utility function U = c + υ(g), where
c denotes the consumption of the private good, g denotes the consumption of the public good
and the function υ(·) satisfies the Inada conditions. In addition to the three domestic agents,
there is an international financial market (IFM) which can lend to or borrow from the country
with no restrictions. The IFM is competitive, risk-neutral, deep-pocketed, has access to an
investment/saving technology with rate of return r = 1 and can perfectly commit to repay in
the future.
Let’s first characterize the technology and the agents of this economy. The entrepreneurs are born
with no endowment but have access to a private production technology. The private technology
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is represented by a continuum of investment projects j operated within individual firms. Projects
have decreasing returns to scale and are subject to two independent shocks, which are observed
at date 1: (i) an aggregate shock, which affects all projects in the same measure, and (ii) an
idiosyncratic shock, which affects each project individually. In particular, investment k in each
project costs k units of the private good at date 0 and delivers a final output fs,j(k) at date 2,
where
fs,j(k) =
 θsAj k if k ≤ k¯θsAj k¯ if k > k¯ , (1)
θs denotes the aggregate shock which depends on the state of the economy s and Aj denotes the
idiosyncratic shocks which is specific to each project j.
The production technology then features stepwise decreasing returns to scale, i.e. the marginal
return on capital is positive (and constant) up to the upper bound k¯ and zero afterwards. This as-
sumption reflects either the existence of indivisibility in physical capital, i.e. machinery, plants,
buildings, or bounded organizational capacity that limits the scope of each entrepreneur’s in-
vestment. Notice that the main results of the paper would go through even if the production
technology were described by a continuously differentiable production function with decreasing
returns to scale. Yet, assuming a production function like (1) permits to pin-point the aspects
of the economy that are crucial for the results of the paper, as discussed with more detail later
on.
The aggregate shock θs reflects all sorts of events that exert a common effect on all firms in
the economy, e.g. improvements in total factor productivity, fluctuations in the terms of trade,
fiscal and economic reforms or changes in the supply of human capital. For the sake of clarity,
I henceforth refer to the aggregate shock as a “productivity” shock and I assume that there are
only two states of the economy, called “good state” and “bad state”. In particular, the aggregate
productivity equals θ¯ > 1 in the good state and θ < 1 in the bad state. Let pi(θ¯) ∈ [0, 1] be the
probability of the good state and let pi(θ) = 1− pi(θ¯) be the probability of the bad state. Lastly,
the aggregate shock is normalized to one in expected terms, i.e.
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ} pi(θs) θs = 1.
The idiosyncratic shock Aj reflects, instead, those events that exert a localized effect on each firm
or sector. As a particular feature of the idiosyncratic shock, I consider that this shock requires an
additional investment by the entrepreneur that receives it. Suitable examples for the idiosyncratic
shock include machinery substitution, industry-specific technology upgrades, sales recalling due
to product imperfections, sudden interruption of supply contracts. The idiosyncratic shock is
hereby termed “expenditure” shock. Suppose that the shock takes only two realizations, i.e. one
half of the firms is “lucky” and does not get the shock while the remaining half is “unlucky”
and gets the shock. Ex-ante all firms are equally likely to be lucky or unlucky. The expenditure
shock causes a decline in firm productivity, which can be offset by an additional investment i. In
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particular, when the firm is lucky, Aj = A and final output is θsAk. On the other hand, when
the firm is unlucky, Aj = a and final output is θs
(
ak + (A − a) i), with i ≤ k given that the
additional investment can at most restore the ex-ante productivity. Recall now that the aggregate
and the idiosyncratic shock are independent and that the aggregate shock is normalized to one
in expected terms. Then, setting A+a2 > 1, the expected return on the initial investment k is
positive. In addition, setting θ (A − a) > 1, the return on the additional investment i is also
positive. Figure 1 describes the timing of private investment projects.
Figure 1: Timing of Investment Projects
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2LUCKY
Investment
k
Idiosyncratic Shock`
prob. 1
2
´
?
UNLUCKY
Reinvestment
i (i ≤ k)
Output
θs Ak
Output
θs
“
ak + (A− a) i
”
The workers have no initial endowment as entrepreneurs, they don’t have access to the private
investment technology but they can work at date 1 obtaining a wage w. The labor income is
then saved until date 2, when workers retire and consume their wealth. The source of workers’
wage is not explicitly determined, as it does not represent a crucial feature for the results of the
model.9
The government maximizes the average utility of domestic agents and has access to a public
investment technology. In particular, by investing g units of the private good, it can provide
a public good from which domestic agents obtain utility υ(g) at date 2. Furthermore, the
government can issue a non-contingent bond (either short-term or long-term) to both domestic
and foreign agents and can collect lump-sum taxes from domestic agents at any date.
In conclusion, the economy has no initial endowment and has positive returns on both private
and public investment. As a result, the economy needs to borrow from the IFM in order to
reap the benefits from investment. In particular, at date 0 entrepreneurs borrow the resources
necessary to start their investment projects by issuing a set of claims (equities) which assign to
each holder an ownership right on a unit share of future production. In addition, the government
9Yet, it is possible to consider that workers supply their labor force to entrepreneurs and receive a remuneration
along the production process.
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finances the public project by issuing a public bond at date 0, which is repaid by collecting taxes
from domestic agents either at date 1 or at date 2 (depending on the maturity structure of the
initial bond issuance).
2.2 Financial frictions
The economy’s access to foreign credit is, however, restricted by weak legal and political domestic
institutions. Suppose either that the scope of financial regulation is somewhat bounded or that
courts’ effectiveness in enforcing private contracts is limited by flaws in judicial procedures or
pervasive corruption of public officers. In all of these circumstances, the economy would suffer
from a lack of private collateral which restricts agents’ ability to borrow from outside investors.
The following assumption provides a formal description of the legal frictions in this economy.
Assumption 1 Domestic entrepreneurs can pledge as collateral only a fraction γ of projects’
output, while workers cannot pledge their future labor income.
Arguably, Assumption 1 resembles the legal environment of an emerging economy characterized
by poor regulation and/or weak enforcement of private financial contracts. This assumption has
crucial consequences in the environment so far described. In particular, entrepreneurs, despite
being risk-neutral, have an incentive to insure against the idiosyncratic shock in order to avoid a
pitfall in the expected revenue from the project. Indeed, when γ A+a2 > 1 and γ θ¯(A−a) < 1, the
initial investment k is profitable for both domestic entrepreneurs and the IFM but the additional
investment i is profitable only for the former. Therefore, unlucky entrepreneurs cannot borrow
in the spot market at date 1 and are forced to abandon the profitable reinvestment.
Clearly, entrepreneurs could efficiently insure against the idiosyncratic shock by underwriting a
contingent contract with the IFM, which promises a positive transfer when the firm is unlucky
in exchange for a positive payment when the firm is lucky. Yet, in this economy there is no such
private insurance.
Assumption 2 Domestic entrepreneurs cannot enter into contracts that are contingent on the
expenditure shock.
This assumption can be justified arguing that poor regulation and ineffective monitoring favor
firms’ moral hazard and, consequently, limit their ability to get insurance. However, an in-depth
discussion of the factors that affect insurance provision is beyond the scope of the paper, and
Assumption 2 is taken as a description of a missing market in the economy. Absent contingent
7
contracts and given that borrowing at date 1 is not possible, the only alternative open to en-
trepreneurs to buffer future shocks is to accumulate reserves of non-contingent securities, which
can be deployed in case of need.
Notice, however, that a benevolent government which seeks to maximize domestic social welfare
and is able to costlessly reallocate resources among domestic agents could design a contingent
redistribution scheme transferring resources from workers and lucky entrepreneurs to unlucky
entrepreneurs. By doing so, the government could substitute the private provision of insurance
fostering the additional investment in distressed projects. Nonetheless, the following assumption
restricts the government from making such transfers.
Assumption 3 The government cannot make positive transfers between domestic agents.
In the following section, I characterize the equilibrium for this economy assuming that agents
are fully rational and there is no asymmetric information, i.e. both types of shocks are perfectly
observable by all agents. In addition, I first consider a benchmark case where the government
has a good reputation and is fully credible.
Assumption 4 The government can credibly commit to fulfill its debt obligations.
The analysis of this particular case, where there is no risk of default on government bonds,
serves a purely illustrative purpose. Indeed, section 3 will show that, in the environment so
far described, the occurrence of a liquidity crisis can be accounted for by relaxing exclusively
Assumption 4.
2.3 Equilibrium with government commitment
At date 0 the representative entrepreneur borrows an amount k + b + f by issuing equities to
the IFM, where k is the initial investment in the project, b is the saving in government bonds
and f is the saving in foreign bonds. At date 1 the entrepreneur can either be lucky or unlucky.
In the former case, the project requires no additional spending and the entrepreneur rolls over
his bond holdings b and f until date 2. In the latter case, the project receives the expenditure
shock and the entrepreneur deploys his saving in order to invest i additional units of the private
good in the project. Finally, his final output is yl(θs) if he has been lucky and yu(θs) if he has
been unlucky, where
yl(θs) = θsAk + b+ f and yu(θs) = θs
(
ak + (A− a) i
)
+ b+ f − i (2)
provided the initial investment k does not exceed the upper bound k¯. In this case, indeed, the
marginal return on k would be equal to zero in each contingency. Yet, we can dismiss this
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possibility as the entrepreneur invests at most k¯ to maximize the net return from the project.
Having obtained the final output from the project, the entrepreneur pays foreign shareholders by
distributing dividends, which must be lower or equal than the firm’s collateral and are respectively
rl(θs) (k+b+f) ≤ γ yl(θs) and ru(θs) (k+b+f) ≤ γ yu(θs). Recall that the IFM is competitive
and risk neutral. Therefore, the IFM accepts to enter only in loan contracts that offer a non-
negative return, i.e.
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ} pi(θs)
[
rl(θs)+ru(θs)
2
]
≥ 1. Lastly, notice that I implicitly assumed
that the representative entrepreneur does not pay taxes. This assumption implies no loss of
generality, as discussed with more detail when I describe the government’s problem. Indeed, in
equilibrium the government does not tax entrepreneurs in order to preserve the net reserves of
liquidity of domestic firms and maximize their reinvestment.
Absent any borrowing constraint, the entrepreneur would choose the initial investment k, the
saving in government bonds b and in foreign bonds f , and the additional investment i to maximize
the expected revenue from the project, as in
Π = max
k,i,b,f
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs) − rl(θs) (k+b+f)
2 +
yu(θs) − ru(θs) (k+b+f)
2
]
(3)
subject to the maximum reinvestment constraint, i ≤ k, the resource constraint at date 1,
i ≤ b+ f , where b ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0, and the non-negative profit constraint on IFM’s loans,∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
rl(θs)+ru(θs)
2
]
≥ 1. (4)
However, as firm’s collateral is limited, the entrepreneur choice is also subject to the borrowing
constraints,
rl(θs)
(
k + b+ f
) ≤ γ yl(θs) and ru(θs) (k + b+ f) ≤ γ yu(θs) (5)
where the firm collateral includes both the value of production and the final bond holdings.
The problem of the entrepreneur then consists in choosing {k, i, b, f} in order to maximize (3)
subject to (4) and (5) plus the maximum reinvestment constraint i ≤ k and the intermediate
period resource constraint i ≤ b+ f , where b ≥ 0, f ≥ 0.
As long as k ≤ k¯, the expected marginal return on initial investment k is positive, i.e. A+a2 > 1,
and the entrepreneur has an incentive to raise initial investment up to k¯.10 Yet, the entrepreneur
can borrow the resources necessary to start the project only when he can credibly promise a
non-negative interest rate (in expected terms) to the IFM, i.e. γ
[
A+a
2
] ≥ 1. This represents the
first condition on the parameter γ.
10Notice that the aggregate shock is omitted as the two shocks (aggregate and idiosyncratic) are independent
and the aggregate shock has been normalized to one.
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Recall now that θ(A − a) > 1 and suppose that γθ¯(A − a) < 1. As discussed before, these two
conditions make the additional investment i profitable for the entrepreneur but not for the IFM.
Then, an unlucky entrepreneur cannot borrow resources in the spot credit market at date 1 and
can only reinvest by deploying his saving in the government and foreign bonds. In particular,
the entrepreneur will use all his reserves of bonds to maximize the profitable reinvestment and
i = b + f . As the case of interest is i < k, I impose a further condition on the parameter γ to
ensure that the maximum reinvestment constraint is never binding and it can be omitted. The
above restrictions are summarized by the following technical assumption.
Technical assumption 1
The parameter γ and θ¯ satisfy the following conditions:
(i) γ > 1A+a
2
, (ii) γ < 2A+a
2 +
1
2 [1+(A−a)]
, (iii) θ¯ < 1γ¯(A−a) .
Maximization of program (3)-(5) implies the following optimal investment and saving deci-
sions,
k = k¯ and b+ f =
γA+a2 − 1
1− γ 12 [1 + (A− a)]
k¯. (6)
The first condition takes into account that the entrepreneur wants to maximize the expected
return on initial investment. The second condition is obtained from the borrowing constraint
(5). It is easy to see that the government bond and the foreign bond are perfect substitutes
and the firm is indifferent between saving at home or saving abroad. Yet, this result depends
crucially on the assumption that the government can credibly commit to repay in the future, in
which case the interest rate on government bonds is set by the world interest rate. In the next
section, instead, this assumption will be relaxed and it will be shown that the firm will be no
more indifferent between the two types of bonds.
Notice also that the lack of collateral does not affect the initial investment of the firm, which is
set at its first-best level. On the contrary, it limits the amount of liquidity, i.e. government and
foreign bonds, that can be stored and used by firms to finance the intermediate reinvestment.11
This result is driven by the stepwise marginal return structure imposed on the production func-
tion and could be easily avoided by considering a more general production technology. It is,
however, well known that the presence of capital market imperfections affects firms’ investment
choices, reducing the stock of capital available for production.12 For this reason, the model has
11In particular, this result depends on the assumption that the marginal return on initial investment is constant
and positive for both entrepreneurs and outside investors, i.e. the IFM. Yet, the intermediate reinvestment is
profitable for entrepreneurs but it reduces the amount of collateral that outside investors can seize from unlucky
firms.
12Since the seminal contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958), scholars have been aware that the presence of
financial frictions affects the capital structure of private companies and distorts their investment choices. Hubbard
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been designed in a way that the presence of borrowing constraints affects exclusively firms’ need
for liquidity and the size of precautionary reserves. Indeed, the results obtained in the central
section of the paper, section 3, arise exclusively from the interaction between firms’ need for
liquidity and the government’s inability to commit.
Consider now the problem of the benevolent government, which has to choose public investment,
debt issuance and individual taxation in order to maximizes the average utility of domestic
agents. The economy has no initial endowment and, therefore, the government must finance the
public investment g by issuing debt. As domestic entrepreneurs are treated as first comers by the
government and workers cannot buy public bonds,13 at the end of date 0 the level of domestic
debt is b and the level of external debt is equal to b∗ = g − b.
Before solving the government’s problem, it is convenient to examine the maturity structure of
public debt. As domestic entrepreneurs and the IFM are indifferent between buying short-term
or long-term debt,14 the government can arbitrarily choose to issue one-period bonds or two-
periods bonds. Furthermore, provided the government taxes only workers at date 1 (while it can
indifferently tax entrepreneurs’ profits and workers’ savings at date 2), the lump-sum taxation
is non-distortionary.15 Therefore, Ricardian Equivalence holds and the government is indifferent
between issuing short or long term debt (as explained in the next section, this result depends
crucially on the government’s ability to commit). Without loss of generality, I then consider
that the government issues only short-term debt and repays it by collecting taxes on domestic
workers at date 1.
The objective function of the government, or social welfare function, is then given by
W = Π + w + υ(g)− τ (7)
where Π is the expected revenue of entrepreneurs, w is the labor income of workers, υ(g) is the
average utility of domestic agents from the public investment g and τ is the taxation on workers
(1998) and Stein (2003) provide two excellent reviews of the economic literature studying the effects of capital
market imperfections on corporate investment. Past research has also shown that a number of macroeconomic
consequences can arise from the presence of borrowing constraints at the corporate level. A necessarily incomplete
list of past contributions include: studies that show that financial frictions generate credit cycles and amplify
aggregate volatility, e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kocherlakota (2000), Martin (2005); studies that show that financial frictions
generate divergence in cross-country wealth distribution, in cross-country or current account balances, respectively
Matsuyama (2004) and Caballero et al. (2008); studies that show that financial instability and sudden stops in
capital inflows in emerging markets are exacerbated by collateral constraints, e.g. Aghion et al. (2004), Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2001), ?, Mendoza (2006).
13Indeed, domestic workers have no wealth at date 0 and cannot borrow as they have no collateral.
14At date 1 domestic entrepreneurs could indeed pledge as collateral their holdings of long-term bonds in order
to get the same amount of liquidity that they could have obtained from the government as a repayment of the
short-term debt. In addition, the IFM is indifferent between short-term and long-term debt by construction.
15On the other hand, taxation on entrepreneurs at date 1 lowers the reserves of liquidity and the profitable
investment of unlucky firms and therefore generates a social dead-weight loss.
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at date 1. The government’s budget constraint is defined by,
g = b+ b∗ and τ = b+ b∗. (8)
Social welfare maximization then implies the following optimality condition for public invest-
ment,
υ′(g) = 1.
Finally, when the first-best public investment is lower or equal than the total saving of domestic
entrepreneurs, i.e. g ≤ b+ f , there exists at least one equilibrium in which the government can
finance the public good by issuing only domestic debt. In the alternative case, i.e. g > b + f ,
public bonds issuance exceeds the total saving of domestic entrepreneurs and the government
needs to borrow from abroad. In the rest of the paper, this second situation would represent the
case of interest.
2.4 Discussion
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and Woodford (1990), argued that government debt enhances
private liquidity provision when there is a lack of collateral in the economy. Their intuition
can be summarized as follows. When workers cannot commit to grant a credit line to domestic
firms (e.g. financial intermediaries have no adequate credibility), the government can implicitly
commit future taxpayers (the workers) to transfer resources to bondholders (the entrepreneurs).
In addition, Holmstrom and Tirole show that the government intervention is welfare improving
even in the presence of a domestic financial market for firm equities. Indeed, the shortage of
collateral creates an under-supply of private securities in the economy and, thus, poses a limit
on the saving capacity of firms. On the contrary, the government, thanks to its assumed ability
to commit workers’ income through taxation, can expand the supply of financial assets above
the value of private collateral.
Anecdotical evidence gives support to this argument. For example, Reinhart et al. (2003) and
Kumhof and Tanner (2005) observe that in many developing countries banks hold large reserves
of public debt (relatively to their net assets), which is then used as collateral in private financial
transactions. In particular, Kumhof and Tanner (2005) show that the ratio of banks’ claims on
the government over their net assets is negatively correlated with an index of creditors right pro-
tection. It is also well known that turnover ratios in secondary markets for government securities
(in particular repo markets) have a greater order of magnitude than in private financial markets,
particularly in many emerging markets (see de la Torre and Schmukler (2004)). Furthermore,
although the theoretical underpinning for government-supplied liquidity is stronger in emerging
markets, it can be argued that government debt also enhances the liquidity of more structured
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financial markets, as shown by the policy discussion on the consequences of the US Treasury
debt paydown in late 90s (see Reinhart et al. (2000)).
It must be remarked that Holmstrom and Tirole’s argument depends crucially on the assumption
that domestic firms cannot store liquidity by saving abroad. When there are no restrictions on
international capital flows and no sovereign risk, the interest rate on government bonds is set by
the world interest rate and entrepreneurs are indifferent between saving in the domestic public
debt or saving abroad. In other words, the IFM provides the economy with sufficient supply
of liquidity and reduces the need for government intervention. The following section, however,
shows that, by relaxing the government commitment assumption in the same setup as before,
Holmstrom and Tirole’s argument can be restored in an open economy setting: as government
repayment becomes contingent on the state of the economy, public debt then represents an
imperfectly substitutable source of liquidity for the domestic private sector. Nonetheless, the
optimal fiscal policy of the government has a downside, as it exposes the economy to costly
liquidity crises.
3 Sovereign risk and liquidity crises
In the previous section the government could perfectly commit to honor its obligations in the fu-
ture. Then, it could efficiently manage public debt to lessen domestic financial inefficiencies and
borrow foreign resources to undertake the public investment. Yet, the long history of sovereign
defaults in emerging markets suggests that the government commitment is, at least, not fully
credible. In the same setup as before, I then relax the assumption of government commitment
(Assumption 4) and I discuss the implications that derive from the interaction between domestic
financial frictions and sovereign risk. In particular, I show that a sovereign default triggers a
liquidity crisis within the economy and that government debt represents an imperfectly substi-
tutable source of liquidity for the private sector.
Assumption 5 The government cannot commit to service its debt and creditors cannot enforce
the government repayment.
The absence of commitment introduces a classic unwillingness-to-pay problem. Ex-post the
government does not want to repay its debt with the IFM as this reduces the average utility of
domestic agents. Given that the IFM foresees the risk of future opportunistic behavior, it doesn’t
want to lend ex-ante and the government cannot borrow from abroad. Conventional models in
the sovereign debt literature usually restore the ex-post incentive to repay by introducing either
a default penalty or a reputational cost when a default occurs. These models can then sustain
foreign lending in equilibrium. Yet, these classic penalties have ambiguous empirical support.
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In this paper, I then take a different perspective, which focuses on the direct consequences of
default on the domestic economy to support external debt.
As noted by Broner and Ventura (2006), the unwillingness-to-pay problem depends crucially on
the ability of the government to discriminate between domestic and foreign bond holders. Indeed,
when selective default on the IFM is not possible, the cost of default is borne also by domestic
agents and this reduces the attractiveness of the ex-post opportunistic behavior. In the setup
described previously, the non-discrimination assumption has clear-cut implications. Given that
a default on government bonds affects the reserve of liquidity of domestic firms and precludes
the profitable reinvestment in distressed projects, the government has an ex-post incentive to
honor its obligations. This would be the case whenever the cost of a liquidity crisis within the
economy exceeds the cost of repaying foreign bond holders.
Assumption 6 The government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign bond holders.
Assumption 6 has both a theoretical and an empirical underpinning. Suppose that government
bonds are held by both domestic entrepreneurs and the IFM, and that agents can trade the bond
in a well-functioning secondary market. The latter assumption is crucial to sustain Assumption
6. If bond holders were stuck with the bonds purchased in the primary market, the government
would be able perfectly to discriminate among domestics and foreigners in each future date and
the latter would never lend to the government in the first place. Instead, when a secondary market
for sovereign bonds is in place, the government might not be able to track down the nationality
of the ultimate holder of each bond issued at date 0 and such lack of information would prevent
a selective default on the bonds held by the IFM. As observed by Broner and Ventura (2006)
and Panizza (2008), this informational flaw represents a widespread phenomenon in emerging
markets.16 The following quote from Reinhart et al. (2003) remarks the same point: “the view
that extemal debt is completely separable from domestically issued debt is dead wrong”.
Broner et al. (2006) argue that the government has no even the incentive to acquire such infor-
mation, when secondary markets work perfectly. Indeed, if the government could discriminate
among domestic and foreign bond holders, the foreigners could unfold their asset positions by
selling the bond to domestics (which would buy the bond at any non-negative discount) and
would de facto receive their payment in any future contingency. Then, if the government wants
to avoid the repayment of foreigners, it must commit to default on all bond holders indiscrim-
inately (e.g., by not gathering information on secondary market transactions and the ultimate
bond holders). By doing so, the government would indeed gain an additional degree of freedom.
The next subsection shows that, in the specific case considered in my paper, the government’s
commitment of non-discriminating among domestics and foreigners introduces the possibility to
16Panizza (2008) reports that in most emerging countries governments commonly fail to keep track of the large
volumes of secondary market transactions and end up with almost no information on the ultimate holders of debt.
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choose a contingent repayment policy, which depends on the trade-off between the cost of trans-
ferring resources to the IFM and the benefit of preserving domestic private sector’s liquidity in
any future contingency.
3.1 Equilibrium with sovereign risk
Recall now that agents are fully rational. Then, the equilibrium with sovereign risk can be solved
by backward induction, starting from date 1. Let b be the quantity of government bonds held by
domestic entrepreneurs, b∗ the quantity of government bonds held by the IFM and θs ∈ {θ, θ¯}
the realization of the aggregate productivity shock. The government behaves strategically and
chooses whether to repay the debt in order to maximize the average consumption of domestic
agents.
Debt repayment would implicitly transfer resources from domestic taxpayers (the workers) to
both domestic bond holders (the entrepreneurs) and foreign bond holders (the IFM). The transfer
to domestic entrepreneurs involves only a redistribution within the economy. Given that the
government does not care about wealth inequality, such a transfer does not reduce aggregate
welfare but improves liquidity provision and the reinvestment of unlucky firms. On the other
hand, the transfer to the IFM involves a redistribution of resources away from the economy and,
as long as the government does not care about foreigners, it implies a loss of domestic welfare.
Then, as the government cannot discriminate among bond holders and selectively default on
foreigners, it faces a clear trade-off when choosing whether to repay or not.
In particular, the government repays its debt only when the benefits for the entrepreneurs exceed
the costs for the workers, or
(1− γ) 1
2
[
1 + θs(A− a)
]
b ≥ b∗ + b, (9)
where the left hand side measures the average consumption gain of entrepreneurs when the
government repays the bond and the right hand side measures the average consumption loss of
workers, in each realization of the aggregate shock θs.17
17The left hand side of (9) is obtained from rearranging the following formula,
Πe=1 −Πe=0 = (1− γ) 1
2
(h
θsAk + ρ b+ f
i
+
h
θs
“
ak + (A− a) i(e = 1)
”
+ ρ b+ f − i(e = 1)
i)
−
− (1− γ) 1
2
(h
θsAk + f
i
+
h
θs
“
ak + (A− a) i(e = 0)
”
+ f − i(e = 0)
i)
where the first term is the average revenue of entrepreneurs when the government repays the bond (e = 1),
while the second term is the average revenue of entrepreneurs when the government does not repay (e = 0). Then,
substitute for i(e) = e ρ b + f , where ρ is the interest rate paid on government bonds and is greater than one as
long as government bonds feature the risk of a future default. Instead, the right hand side of (9) is the value of
taxes that the government collects from domestic workers to repay the bond in t = 1, τ1 = ρ(b+ b∗).
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When the quantity b∗ of government bonds held by the IFM falls within the interval [b∗(b), b¯∗(b)],
where
b∗(b) ≡ {(1− γ) 12 [1 + θ (A− a)] − 1} b,
b¯∗(b) ≡ {(1− γ) 12 [1 + θ¯ (A− a)] − 1} b, (10)
the government repays the bond in the good state and defaults in the bad state. In the latter
case, indeed, aggregate productivity drops and the return on additional investment declines. As
a result, the social cost of a liquidity crisis is lower than the cost of repaying foreigners and
therefore the government repudiates its debt.
Suppose now that in equilibrium the government actually honors its obligations only in the good
state, that is b∗ ∈ [b∗(b), b¯∗(b)]. Then,
e =
{
1 if θs = θ¯ with prob. pi(θ¯)
0 if θs = θ with prob. 1− pi(θ¯)
, (11)
where e ∈ {0, 1} denotes the repayment choice of the government. The rest of the analysis
confirms this initial guess.
Take now a step backward and consider date 0. Given that the government bond now features
the possibility of future repudiation, it must include a positive risk premium. In particular, as
agents are risk neutral, the government bond must yield
ρ =
1
pi(θ¯)
(12)
units of the private good in the good state of date 1 for any unit received at date 0, where pi(θ¯)
is the probability of the good state. As the repayment of government bonds now depends on the
state of the economy, as in (11), and includes a positive risk premium, as in (12), at date 0 the
representative entrepreneur foresees that, for any initial choice {k, b, f}, his final output will be
given by
yl(θs, e) = θsAk + e ρ b+ f
yu(θs, e) = θs
(
ak + (A− a) i(e)
)
+ e ρ b+ f − i(e)
, (13)
depending on whether he will be lucky or unlucky, where i(e) ≤ e ρ b+ f . Then, the problem of
the representative entrepreneur is now defined by
Π(e) = max
k,i,b,f
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs,e) − rl(θs,e) (k−b−f)
2 +
yu(θs,e) − ru(θs,e) (k−b−f)
2
]
, (14)
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subject to the maximum reinvestment constraint, i(e) ≤ k, the resource constraint at date 1
(which is now contingent on the state of the economy as a consequence of the government’s
default policy), i.e. i(e) ≤ e ρ b + f , where b ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0, and the non-negative profit
constraint on IFM’s loans, ∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
rl(θs,e) + ru(θs,e)
2
]
≥ 1. (15)
As in the previous section, the entrepreneur’s choice is subject to a borrowing constraint, which
is now given by
rl(θs, e)
(
k + b+ f
) ≤ γ yl(θs, e) and ru(θs, e) (k + b+ f) ≤ γ yu(θs, e) (16)
Once again, I ensure that the maximum reinvestment constraint is never binding in equilib-
rium via Technical Assumption 2. Then, as additional investment is always profitable for the
entrepreneur, we can substitute for i(e) = e ρ b+ f in both (14) and (16).
Technical assumption 2
The parameter γ satisfies the additional condition:
(iv) γ < 1+piA+a
2 + pi
1
2 [1+θ¯(A−a)]
.
Before proceeding to the solution of program (14)-(16), it is worth remarking that the represen-
tative entrepreneur is no longer indifferent between the government and the foreign bond but
he strictly prefers the former. This is a consequence of the procyclical payouts of government
bonds, which guarantee a greater liquidity provision when there is a high return from additional
investment. In order to show formally this result, let’s rearrange (14)-(16) by substituting for
(13) and the non-negative profit constraint (15), which is binding in equilibrium. Then, the
solution of the entrepreneur’s problem solves
Π(e) = max
k,i,b,f
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs, e) + yu(θs, e)
2
]
− (k − b− f), (17)
subject to
k + b+ f ≤ γ
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs, e) + yu(θs, e)
2
]
. (18)
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Notice now that the expected output from the project can be rearranged as,∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs,e)+yu(θs,e)
2
]
=
[
Ak + b+ f
]
+
[
ak + θ¯(A− a)b+ (A− a)f
]
.
It is easy to see that government and foreign bonds are no longer perfect substitutes. When the
entrepreneur is unlucky, indeed, the return on savings in government bonds is greater than the
return on savings in foreign bonds as the entrepreneur benefits from receiving a larger payment
(due to the risk premium) when the state of the economy is good and the return on additional
investment is high. Therefore, when the representative entrepreneur saves in the risky government
bond rather than in the foreign risk-less bond, the objective function (17) is shifted upward and
the borrowing constraint (18) is looser. As a result, the entrepreneur is unambiguously better
off by saving exclusively in the risky government bond.
Maximization of program (17)-(18) then implies the following optimal investment and saving
decisions,
k = k¯, b =
γA+a2 − 1
1− γ 12 [1 + θ¯(A− a)]
k¯ and f = 0. (19)
Similarly as before, the first condition takes into account that the entrepreneur wants to maximize
the expected return on initial investment, which is, by construction, unaffected by the presence
of sovereign risk. The second condition, instead, is obtained from the borrowing constraint
(18).
The attentive reader could object that the result described by condition (19) crucially depends on
the assumed risk neutrality of domestic entrepreneurs. Indeed, if the representative entrepreneur
were risk-averse, they would seek to maximize his expected utility rather than the expected
output from the project. Then, although saving in the procyclical government bond would raise
the project’s expected output, the risk-averse entrepreneur would prefer to smooth his future
consumption by saving in the acyclical foreign bond. Yet, this statement is not necessarily true
when the IFM is risk neutral.18 In such a case, the representative entrepreneur will be facing
a trade-off when choosing to save in the government or in the foreign bond. On one hand,
the higher expected production, obtained by saving in the procyclical government bond, would
relax the borrowing constraint (18) and it would consent to store larger reserves of liquidity.
On the other hand, the possibility to smooth consumption across future states would bias the
entrepreneur’s preference towards the foreign bond, as it would increase his expected utility. In
the appendix, I show that, when the degree of risk aversion is sufficiently low, condition (19) still
holds in equilibrium and domestic firms save exclusively in government bonds.
18The risk neutrality of the IFM is a standard assumption in the literature. The underlying idea is that the
IFM can perfectly diversify the aggregate risk associated with the investment in a small open economy.
18
Consider now the problem of the benevolent government. As in the perfect commitment case,
the government choose public investment, debt issuance and individual taxation in order to
maximizes the average utility of domestic agents. Yet, the sovereign risk friction poses a limit
on the government’s ability to borrow from the IFM. Indeed, the level of external debt must be
now compatible with the ex-post incentive to pay of the government.
Notice first that the government can no longer arbitrarily choose to issue short-term or long-term
debt. In particular, the government’s default is costly only when it involves the repudiation of
short-term debt. In this case, indeed, the default dries up domestic liquidity and, as a result,
the issuance of both domestic and external debt can be compatible with the ex-post incentive to
pay of the government. On the other hand, a default on long-term debt would entail no losses
for domestic firms: indeed, the announcement of a default on long-term debt could be postponed
until date 2, when unlucky firms already financed the additional investment (by either pledging as
collateral their bond holdings or trading them in secondary markets).19 In the equilibrium with
sovereign risk, then, the government can issue only short-term debt and repays it by collecting
taxes on domestic workers at date 1 (since taxation on entrepreneurs is costly, as discussed in
the perfect commitment case).
The problem of the government then involves the choice of the policy {g, b, b∗, τ(e)} that maxi-
mizes,
W = Π(e) + w + υ(g)− τ(e) (20)
where Π(e) is the expected revenue of entrepreneurs, and is now conditional on the government
repayment choice, w is the labor income of workers, υ(g) is the average utility of domestic agents
from the public investment g and τ(e) denotes the expected value of date 1 taxation on workers,
i.e. τ(e) = pi(θ¯) ρ (b+ b∗). Beside the government’s budget constraint,
g = b+ b∗ and τ(e) = b+ b∗, (21)
the government’s optimal policy is now subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint,
g ≤ b+ b¯∗(b), (22)
where b is determined by (19) and the external debt ceiling b¯∗(b) is defined as in (10). That is,
the government can borrow from private agents (namely, domestic entrepreneurs and the IFM)
only if they can rationally expect that the public debt will be repaid in at least one state of the
economy (the good state).
Supposing that the first-best investment in the public project is incompatible with future repay-
19Yet, long-term debt could be sustained if the government had some type of short-term commitment (as in
Broner et al. (2006)), which allows it to announce at date 1 whether it will repay the debt due at date 2.
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ment, it is possible to show that constraint (22) is binding in equilibrium. Therefore, the equilib-
rium investment in the public project is given by the following constrained-efficient level,
g = b+ b¯∗(b).
The government has, indeed, a twofold incentive to borrow up to the debt ceiling b + b¯∗(b).
On one side, the government can undertake a larger investment in the public project, which
enhances the welfare of all domestic agents. On the other side, such a borrowing level would
induce a procyclical repayment scheme which benefits domestic entrepreneurs.
3.2 Discussion
In spite of its simple structure, this model suggests a number of interesting implications. Most
notably, the model shows that external debt can emerge even in absence of “classic” penalties
(e.g., trade sanctions and exclusion from international capital markets) or reputational costs (as
the model considers a one shot game). Indeed, the prospect of triggering a liquidity crisis in the
domestic economy restores the government incentive to repay the debt and thereby its ex-ante
ability to borrow from foreigners. In this respect, my paper proposes a mechanism through which
external debt can be sustained without any intervention of foreign creditors. In particular, the
mechanism considered differs from the ones already discussed in the literature, e.g. Broner and
Ventura (2006).20 These authors, indeed, consider an endowment economy where default leads
to an undesirable redistribution of resources between domestic agents. In my model, instead,
sovereign default leads to a disruption of private investment.
Second, the model rationalizes the emergence of liquidity crises in the event of sovereign default.
When economic conditions are good (positive aggregate productivity or terms-of-trade shocks),
the government wants to transfer resources from taxpayers (the workers) to domestic bondhold-
ers (the entrepreneurs) and repays the bond. Although such a transfer is costly since it involves
the repayment of foreign bondholders, the cost is more than offset by large returns on firms’
reinvestment. On the contrary, when economic conditions are bad (negative aggregate produc-
tivity or terms-of-trade shocks), the cocktail of high debt and low investment returns precipitates
the economy into a liquidity crisis triggered by sovereign default. The model then suggests that
default episodes tend to appear more likely in economies characterized by either volatile business
cycle or, if we were to consider the aggregate shock as a terms-of-trade shock, pronounced real
exchange rate fluctuations.
Concerning this second point, it is worth remarking that there has been a great deal of discussion
in the profession on possible reforms of the international financial architecture in order to avoid
20Sandleris (2004) proposes a further mechanism through which sovereign default exerts a direct consequence
on the domestic private sector.
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the social costs associated with recent debt crises in emerging markets.21 A classic view in
the literature is that default represents the only form of insurance against adverse economic
conditions available to sovereigns, despite the fact that it is globally inefficient.22 As sovereign
contractual arrangements do not allow to issue contingent instruments, governments decide to
default during bad times as an indirect way to implement a contingent contract. Yet, default
episodes are usually associated with large dead-weight losses, given that the costs on creditors
are not fully reflected in the borrower’s benefits. Such inefficiency has then stimulated several
proposal to improve the effectiveness of bail-out programs which could provide an alternative
source of insurance to countries. The same considerations can be extrapolated from the previous
model. Yet, in my model, the source of the dead-weight loss is not the imposition of foreign
penalties, as usually considered, but it is the result of a domestic liquidity crunch.23 As the
model suggests that the source of social losses is to be looked for in the liquidity crisis triggered
by default and not in foreign penalties, this paper provides a theoretical support for crises
resolution policies that refuse to sacrifice domestic claims to service external debt.
4 Institutional and Policy Reforms
The results discussed in the previous section depend crucially on the interaction between pri-
vate capital markets imperfections and sovereign risk, and in particular on the following fric-
tions:
(i) the lack of firms’ collateral, as described in Assumption 1;
(ii) the missing market for private insurance, as described in Assumption 2;
(iii) the unwillingness-to-pay problem, as described in Assumptions 5 and 6.
The lack of collateral generates the need for liquidity of domestic firms. Were unlucky firms
to be able to guarantee to the IFM a non-negative return on the additional investment i, i.e.
γ θ(A − a) > 1, they would have no need to accumulate reserves of government bonds. Indeed,
unlucky firms would be able to borrow the resources they need (to offset the expenditure shock)
in the spot credit market at date 1. As already remarked before, the lack of firms’ collateral then
makes domestic entrepreneurs willing to insure against the expenditure shock, as they want to
avoid a pitfall in the expected revenue from the project.
21See for instance the last chapter in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006).
22Tomz and Wright (2007) provide empirical support to this view showing that sovereign defaults occur more
often during “bad times”.
23In general, trade sanctions or capital market exclusion represent a dead-weight welfare loss as they reduce
the gains from trade.
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The missing market for private insurance implies that domestic entrepreneurs are not able ef-
ficiently to insure against the expenditure shock. Indeed, they cannot under-write contingent
contracts with the IFM, which promise a positive transfer when the firm is unlucky in exchange
for a positive payment when the firm is lucky. Absent contingent contracts and given that bor-
rowing at date 1 is not possible, the only alternative open to entrepreneurs to buffer future
shocks is to accumulate reserves of non-contingent securities, which can be deployed in case of
need.
Lastly, the unwillingness-to-pay problem, interacted with the two previous frictions, exacerbates
the financial instability of the domestic economy, as it introduces the risk of widespread liquidity
crises. When choosing whether to honor its debt obligations, the government faces, indeed, a
trade-off that depends on the state of the economy. As previously shown, liquidity crises might
arise when economic conditions deteriorate and the government chooses opportunistically to
default in order to avoid the repayment of foreigners.
The purpose of this section is to discuss the legal and institutional reforms that could improve
private liquidity provision and reduce the economy’s exposure to government debt. It should be
now clear that, in this economy, such reforms would have to deal with each one of the points
enumerated above.
Clearly, reforms that raise the value of firms’ collateral (e.g. reforms of bankruptcy procedures,
improvements in accounting standards, information disclosure) would shift upward the param-
eter γ, thereby relaxing the borrowing constraint of domestic entrepreneurs both at the initial
investment stage (date 0) and along the production process (date 1). Such reforms would then
relax firms’ need to hoard liquidity and would ultimately lead to deeper markets for private
equities.
However, when the rise of private collateral is not followed by institutional and political reforms
that enhance the government’s credibility, deeper markets for private equities could crowd out
sovereign debt markets. The intuition is the following. As entrepreneurs would have no need
to save in government bonds, a default on public debt would have no effect on the additional
investment of domestic firms and the government would be able to repudiate its debt at no
cost. By foreseeing the risk of an opportunistic behavior by the government, the IFM would
refrain from buying public bonds. Such effect on the composition of international capital inflows
in the economy would, nevertheless, fade away as soon as the government acquires a credible
commitment technology.24
24As discussed in Henry and Lorentzen (2003), the distinction between equity and debt flows is critical to assess
the benefits from global financial liberalization. Equity contracts create risk-sharing as they involve procyclical
payouts and can therefore lead to balance-of-payment stabilization. Debt contracts, instead, require constant
payments regardless of economic conditions and can potentially provoke sudden flows reversals when investors
become concerned about either the liquidity or the solvency of the borrower. A prudent international financial
architecture should then favor equity flows. Nonetheless, debt flows (with a preponderance of public and publicly-
guaranteed debt flows) constitute a prominent share of total capital inflows in developing countries (see for
instance Table 4 in Henry (2007)). Therefore, “the critical issue is what distortions in the international financial
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Yet, it could be argued that the lack of collateral and the absence of government’s commitment,
i.e. points (i) and (iii), might also depend on factors not directly related to the improvement of
the legal and institutional environment. In particular, there might be technological reasons that
avoid the build-up of firms’ collateral, e.g. specialization in sectors with low asset tangibility,
and political, technological and social reasons that might jeopardize the future solvency of the
government, e.g. political instability, excessive reliance on natural resources having volatile
returns, social unrest and civil wars. For these reasons, in the following analysis I will maintain
the assumptions that the economy suffers from a lack of private collateral and the government’s
commitment is not credible. Instead, I will focus more specifically on friction (ii), which, arguably,
is more closely related to the state of legal institutions in the country.
4.1 Endogenous insurance provision
So far, the inability of domestic firms to get insurance from the IFM has been considered as an
exogenous feature of the economy. As argued before, this assumption stands on the presence of
moral hazard issues on the firm side. This section analyzes the government incentive to improve
domestic regulation in order to relax this friction. The ultimate purpose of this analysis is to
describe the economic conditions that lead to such reforms.
Suppose that in this economy there exist two types of firms, which I call respectively “good”
and “bad”. In particular, good firms can obtain insurance from the IFM which commits to
provide a contingent credit line when the firm receives an adverse shock (in exchange for an ini-
tial payment). The idea is that good firms represents strictly regulated and actively monitored
companies where moral hazard issues are negligible. Bad firms, instead, represents poorly regu-
lated companies which are not able to get insurance and therefore must save in non-contingent
government bonds in order to buffer future shocks. In addition, the proportion of good firms
in the economy is endogenously determined by the government’s decision to reform domestic
regulation.
Assumption 2’ A fraction λ of domestic firms (good firms) can enter into state-contingent
contracts with the IFM. The remaining fraction of domestic firms (bad firms) cannot enter into
state-contingent contracts. The government can costlessly increase the fraction λ by improving
domestic regulation.
system produce incentives that lead to so much debt and so little equity” (Henry (2007)). A vast macroeconomic
literature points the finger to a weak protection of the rights of equity investors in developing countries. Yet, as
poor creditor rights protection is usually correlated with low credibility of governments, this argument can account
for the low levels of equity flows but it cannot convincingly explain why debt flows are so large (in relative terms).
Indeed, the risk of debt repudiation should deter debt flows. The novelty of this paper is then to study how
the lack of private collateral shapes the sovereign incentive to repay its debt. In doing so, it can explain why,
in countries characterized by a weak legal enforcement, foreign investors substitute equity contracts with debt
contracts rather than simply refrain from investing in the country. Whilst in the former case the composition
of capital flows changes, as suggested by data, in the latter case total capital inflows would decline without a
necessary effect on their composition.
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In choosing the new regulation, the government faces a clear trade-off. On one side, the gov-
ernment can raise the fraction of firms that are able efficiently to insure against adverse shocks.
On the other hand, as more firms can insure using contingent insurance contracts rather than
hoarding reserves of public bonds, the ex-post incentive to repay of the government declines.
The IFM, fearing future defaults, would then stop purchasing bonds from the government, which
is forced to forgo the investment in the public project. At some point, however, the return on
public investment grows so much that the government has no more incentive to improve domestic
regulation.
In order to describe the equilibrium for this new setup, it is convenient to consider a simple
case where there is only the idiosyncratic expenditure shock. Hence, throughout this section
there are no aggregate productivity shocks and the aggregate productivity θ is normalized to
one. This assumption does not affect the relative revenues of good and bad firms. Indeed, as
contingent insurance contracts can be made contingent on the aggregate productivity shock as
government bonds (which would be contingent on the realization of aggregate productivity as a
result of government’s default), the difference between the two types of assets is independent on
the presence of the aggregate shock.
Yet, when there are no aggregate shocks, there will be no sovereign default in equilibrium. As
private agents can now perfectly foresee the future (i.e., the equilibrium is deterministic), they
limit their purchases of public bonds in order to preserves the government’s ex-post incentive to
honor its obligations. In this case, the interest rate on government bonds is set by the world
interest rate and domestic (bad) firms are indifferent between saving in the domestic public debt
or saving abroad (as in the perfect commitment case). In this section, though, I focus on the
equilibrium in which domestic (bad) firms save only in government bonds (and not in foreign
bonds). The implicit assumption, here, is that, as domestic savings in public bonds permit to
sustain a positive level of external debt, the government can coordinate domestic entrepreneurs
to save exclusively in government bonds.
4.1.1 Equilibrium
Let’s first derive the expected revenue for a bad firm and a good firm. As the reform raises
the number of good firms in the economy, the marginal benefit of the reform is given by the
difference between the two revenues.
Consider first a bad firm which can only save in government bonds. As there are no aggregate
shocks, there is no sovereign default in equilibrium and it is possible to show that the optimal
investment and saving decisions of the representative bad firm are pinned down by condition
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(6).25 Substituting for these conditions, the expected revenue of bad firms is equal to
ΠB = (1− γ)
A+a
2 − δ(A− a)
1− γ δ(A− a) k¯,
where δ = 12
(
1 + 1A−a
)
< 1 as (A− a) > 1.
Consider now a good firm. In this case, the entrepreneur can buy a contingent security that
promises a unit of good if the firm receives the expenditure shock. Let x denote the number of
securities purchased by the entrepreneur in the initial period. As agents are risk neutral, the
price q of the contingent security has to be actuarial fair in equilibrium, i.e. q = 12 . Therefore,
by borrowing an amount k + 12x at date 0, the representative entrepreneur of a good firm can
get as final outputs
yGl = Ak and yGu = ak + (A− a)x (23)
where x ≤ k, depending on being lucky or unlucky. Substituting for (23) into the entrepreneur’s
problem (3)-(5), the expected revenue of a good firm is given by
ΠG = (1− γ)
A+a
2 − (A− a)
1− γ (A− a) k¯,
where the optimal investment and saving decisions are respectively k = k¯ and x = 2 γ
A+a
2 −1
1−γ(A−a) .
Notice that, as γ > 1A+a
2
, the first order derivative of ΠB with respect to δ is positive and
therefore,
ΠG > ΠB ,
since δ < 1. In addition, the difference in the revenues of good and bad firms is increasing in the
expected productivity of domestic projects, i.e. A+a2 .
Although the reform raises the expected revenue of domestic firms, the government incentive
to improve domestic regulation declines with the number of good firms in the economy. As
discussed above, indeed, the reform reduces the ability of the government to borrow (both from
domestic and foreign investors) making the public good provision to fall. At some point, then,
the cost of increasing the number of good firms in the economy (measured by the marginal return
on public goods) exceeds its benefit (measured by the difference between good firms’ and bad
firms’ profits) and the government would stop improving the domestic regulation. In particular,
the government chooses the number of good firms λ and the policy {g, b, b∗, τ},26 in order to
25Notice that I set f = 0 in condition (6), as above discussed.
26Notice that the government can only issue short-term debt. As discussed in section 3, indeed, a government’s
default generates a cost for the domestic economy only when it involves the repudiation of short-term debt.
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maximize the social welfare function,
W = λΠG + (1− λ)ΠB + w + υ(g)− τ,
subject to the budget constraints,
g = b+ b∗ and τ = b+ b∗,
and the incentive-compatibility constraint,
g ≤ (1− λ)b+ b¯∗
(
(1− λ)b
)
where (1− λ)b is the aggregate demand for public bonds of bad firms and
b¯∗
(
(1− λ)b
)
≡ (1− λ)
[
(1− γ) δ(A− a) − 1
]
b
is the maximum level of borrowing from foreign investors sustainable in equilibrium. Supposing
that the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding in equilibrium (i.e. the first best investment
is not incentive-compatible), maximization of the social welfare function with respect to λ implies
the equilibrium conditions,
λ = 1− Λυ′−1
(
1 + Λ(ΠG −ΠB)
)
,
g = (1− λ) Λ,
where Λ = 1(1−γ)δ(A−a)b > 0.
As the function υ(·) is strictly increasing and concave, it is easy to see that the government’s
decision to increase the number of good firms in the economy depends positively on the average
productivity of private projects (as ΠG − ΠB is increasing in A+a2 ) and negatively on domestic
agents’ marginal utility from the public good. The model then describes the economic conditions
that lead to better regulation. Consider for instance an emerging country with a scarce level
of public infrastructures and human capital and highly specialized in small scale labor intensive
sectors. Standard growth and trade theories predict large returns on public investment and small
returns on private investment in physical capital. In such a case, the government would have
almost no incentive to improve domestic regulation as the returns on public investment in both
public infrastructures and education are large relative to the benefits from private investment. As
ultimate outcome, the domestic financial system would be characterized by a preponderance of
public debt instruments and scarce insurance access of domestic firms. On the contrary, in coun-
tries characterized by a good supply of public infrastructure and large returns on private projects,
26
the benevolent government would more likely undertake reforms that reduce moral hazard issues
and enhance more sophisticated form of insurance available to domestic firms.
5 Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises: some empirical
evidence
As discussed in previous sections, sovereign default triggers a liquidity crisis within the econ-
omy. In particular, it dries up the private sector’s reserves of liquidity and thus reduces both
reinvestment and final output of domestic firms. Although the model takes a representative
agent perspective, it is natural to think that firms with larger liquidity needs will experience
sharper consequences in the event of default. In this section, I provide cross-country, cross-
industry empirical evidence that is suggestive of the mechanism emphasized by the model. More
specifically, the empirical strategy consists in using cross-country data on manufacturing sectors
to test whether industries highly dependent on external finance and with large working capital
needs experience sharper contractions in the event of default. Since the seminal contribution
of Rajan and Zingales (1998), scholars have been looking at the performance of industries with
different reliance on financial intermediation in order to derive implications on the real effects
of cross-country, cross-time variation in financial institutions. In this paper, I apply a similar
methodology to inspect whether industries with high liquidity needs and strong dependence on
external finance experience a disproportionate output contraction in the event of default, as
suggested by the theoretical model.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the empirical analysis here performed cannot be considered
as a proper test of the model, but rather a way to provide empirical evidence consistent with
its predictions. Indeed, there exist alternative theories that predict a disproportional effect of
sovereign default on industries that rely on external sources of finance. In particular, if a sovereign
default provokes a sudden stop in foreign lending, financially dependent industries would likely
suffer the most. In this case, the empirical evidence would be consistent with the prediction of
my model, but the mechanism in place would be different from the one I suggest. As commonly
recognized, the identification of the exact nature of the costs associated with sovereign default
is not an easy task, given that such costs could arise either from direct sanctions, loss of access
to international markets or, as here supposed, from an economy-wide liquidity crisis.27 One
advantage of using the cross-industry variation within each country is that it is possible to control
for country-wide characteristics, as for instance the degree of capital account liberalization (and
thus the effects captured hold for any level of penetration of foreign financial institutions in the
domestic credit market). Yet, although this methodology permits to reduce the omitted variable
criticism, the reader should be aware of potential identification pitfalls, as above described.
27Refer to Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) for a survey of the most influential empirical attempts in this
respect.
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This empirical hypothesis is tested using the dynamic panel data model,
yi,c,t = αi,c + λi,t + µc,t + yi,c,t−1 + (24)
+
T∑
τ=0
(
βF,τ FinDepi + βL,τ Liqi + βX,τ Xi
)
·DEFc,t−τ + i,c,t,
where the (log) value added in industry i of country c in time t, yi,c,t, is fitted using the lagged
dependent variable to control for mean reverting dynamics and a set of industry-country, αi,c,
industry-time, λi,t, and country-time, µc,t, fixed effects to control for additional explanatory
variables omitted in the regression. Notice that the average effect of default on manufacturing
production is captured by the country-time fixed effect µc,t. Lastly, the above specification in-
cludes a set of interaction terms constructed using a default indicator DEFc,t−τ , which takes
a value of one if country c defaulted τ years ago, and a variety of industry characteristics. In
particular, FinDepi is a measure of an industry’s dependence on external finance, Liqi is a
measure of an industry’s need for liquidity and Xi is a variable set of additional industry charac-
teristics which is used to check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of further controls.
An important aspect of this specification is that both financial dependence and liquidity needs
are computed using data on US industries and do not vary across countries. This assumption
is standard in the empirical literature that built on Rajan and Zingales (1998). The economic
justification for using a country-invariant index based on US data (where financial frictions are
arguably negligible) is to isolate technological differences that affect each industry’s demand for
both external finance and liquidity from country characteristics that affect their supply (as for
instance different degrees of financial development).28 Furthermore, as long as those technolog-
ical differences are likely to persist across countries, these US-based indexes are valid proxies
for the relative financial needs of industries based in other countries. Given that FinDepi and
Liqi take higher values when an industry shows greater financial dependence and higher liquidity
needs, negative coefficients on the interaction terms, i.e. βF < 0 and βL < 0, suggest that this
industry experiences sharper output losses in the event of default.
5.1 Econometric methodology
This subsection describes the econometric methodology applied to estimate equation (24). First,
I remove the industry-time effects, λi,t and the country-time effects, µc,t, by industry-time and
country-time differencing prior to estimation, i.e. all instruments and all regressors are differenced
by subtracting the mean for each industry and each time period and then by subtracting the
mean for each country and each time period. In particular, the average effect of default on
all industries in a given country is captured by the country-time effect µc,t and therefore does
28See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a similar justification.
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not appear in the final results. Second, the presence of the lagged dependent variable among
regressors affects the consistency of the within estimator used in static panel data. As reviewed in
Bond (2002), the standard procedure in dynamic panel data models is then to use a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator after first-differencing the data (with the exception of
the terms interacted with the default dummy in this particular study) in order to eliminate the
industry-country fixed effects. This method was first proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and
Arellano and Bond (1991). As instruments to set the identifying moment conditions, I use the
first lag the lagged dependent variable, taken in levels. Instead, the interaction between the
default dummies and the industry characteristics are assumed to be fully exogenous and, to the
extent that the model is already over-identified, are not used as instruments.29 In addition, a
number of statistical tests apply to control the validity of the assumptions on which the GMM
difference estimator is based, as suggested by Arellano and Bond. The first is a Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions that tests the validity of the instruments. The second is a test of
second-order serial correlation in the error term. Baltagi (1995) (p. 131), indeed, stresses that a
crucial assumption to apply this method is that the differenced error term is MA(1) and therefore
its autocorrelation must fade away after the first lag.
5.2 Data
Data on manufacturing industries are obtained from the INDSTAT3 2005 database available
from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. The UNIDO database reports
annual data for value added in each manufacturing sector at the 3-digit ISIC classification for a
broad sample of countries starting from the 1960s. Original data in current US dollars are first
converted in constant prices using the US GDP deflator, as reported in the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators 2006. As reported in the data appendix, I impose some restrictions to
the original data in order to reduce measurement errors and sporadic observations. This is a
standard procedure in previous studies employing the same database, which tend to be quite
noisy.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), the financial dependence index, FinDeps, measures the
share of investment that is not financed with cash flow from operations. I take the data from
Kroszner et al. (2007), who report the Rajan and Zingales’ index over the period 1980-1999 on a
three-digit ISIC level (rather than a mixture of three-digit and four-digit levels). Based on U.S.
publicly listed firm data, this index arguably reflects technological characteristics of industries
that are relatively stable across space and time. The original data are, then, normalized such
that they range from 0 to 1, with a higher number indicating greater financial dependence. This
eases results readability.
29In particular, I would like to stress that the sovereign default represents an exogenous shock in the dynamics
of sectoral outputs. Indeed, this assumption would fail only if governments repudiate their debt when financially
dependent industries perform relatively poorly. Though, this appears to be quite unrealistic since a default
possibly reflects a widespread economic downturn rather than a localized sectoral contraction.
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The measure of industry liquidity needs, Liqs, is defined following Raddatz (2006). His measure
is computed as the median ratio of inventories over annual sales of US public manufacturing firms
from Compustat, in the same spirit as the Rajan and Zingales’s measure of external dependence.
This ratio captures the fraction of inventories that can be financed with ongoing revenue and,
arguably, is particularly suitable for capturing technological aspects that shape liquidity needs. In
particular, firms’ needs for working capital raise with the spell of the production process: indeed,
the longer the production process the larger is the value of inventories over current sales. Once
again, I take the data from Kroszner et al. (2007), who report the Raddatz index over the period
1980-1999 on a three-digit ISIC level (rather than a four-digit level as in the original Raddatz
measure). Notice that the correlation between the external dependence index, FinDeps, and
the liquidity needs index, Liqs, is low (0.09) and not statistically different from zero, suggesting
that the two index capture different aspects of an industry’s financial needs. In particular, the
Raddatz measure is specifically designed to capture very short term working capital needs, while
the Rajan and Zingales index represents a broader measure of financial needs which does not
necessarily distinguish between the short-term and the long-term horizon.
In order to control for additional industry characteristics, Xs, that might affect industry perfor-
mance in the event of default, I include in the main specification the interaction terms between
the default indicator and two more industry-specific indexes: namely, an index of assets’ tan-
gibility, Tangs, and an index of export orientation, ExpOrs,c. The former index is computed
as the median ratio of fixed assets over total assets for US firms in the period 1980-1999 at the
3-digit ISIC classification and is taken from Kroszner et al. (2007). The latter index is instead
measured at the country-industry level, as in
ExpOrs,c =
1
T
1980+T∑
t=1980
Exportss,c,t
Outputs,c,t
.
In words, ExpOrs,c is the average share of exports over total sales. Notice that the export
orientation index cannot be computed using only US data, as the other industry characteristics.
Indeed, the crucial assumption in the Rajan and Zingales methodology is that the rank of US
industries based on financial needs is maintained across all countries (if an industry is more
financially dependent in the US it is likely to be more financially dependent also in Argentina).
Whilst this assumption is reasonable when it refers to financial needs, it is likely to be rejected
when we look at industries’ export orientation since technological factors do predict that the
export orientation of industries in different countries is shaped by country-specific comparative
advantages (if a US industry exports more with respect to other industries, this does not imply
that the same industry in Argentina will export more than other Argentine industries). The
data source used to construct the export orientation index is Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), who
report export and import values for each ISIC industry.
Data on default episodes are sourced from the Standard and Poor’s sovereign default database, as
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reported in Beers and Chambers (2002). This database includes all sovereign defaults on loans or
bonds with private agents between 1975 and 2002, and reports the period during which the debtor
government remained in default. The immediate effect of default is captured giving a value of
one to the dummy variable in the first year of each default episode. Finally, the resulting sample
includes 28 manufacturing sectors in a cross-section of 108 countries over the period 1980-2002,
although the sectoral representation can vary across countries and years.
5.3 Results
Table 3 reports the one-step first-differenced GMM estimates of (24) where I do not include
positive lags for the default indicator (i.e. T = 0) in order to focus on the instantaneous
effects of default. Furthermore, table 3 reports the main estimates for 1980-1990 sample and
for the 1990-2002 sample to check the time stability of the key coefficients over the two periods.
Notice, first, that the autocorrelation coefficient ρ is statistically significant and pretty stable
over the different specifications. A back-of-envelope calculations suggests that temporary shocks
to sectoral output are quite persistent over time, with an implied persistency of about three
years.
Turning to the interaction between sovereign default and industry characteristics, the point es-
timates of βF and βL have negative sign over all specifications and this result suggests that
industries with high dependence on external finance and high liquidity needs experience a dis-
proportionate contraction in the event of sovereign default. Yet, the results also show that this
effect is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of additional industry controls only
in the sub-period 1990-2002. This result does not imply a rejection of the theoretical model,
but, possibly, a stronger support for it. Indeed, a crucial assumption in the model, namely the
non-discrimination between foreign and domestic bond holders, suits more realistically the insti-
tutional set-up of sovereign debt markets in the 1990s. As noted by Broner and Ventura (2006),
during the 1980s most sovereign borrowing was granted by foreign financial institutions in the
form of syndicated bank loans, whilst private national financial markets were highly segmented.
“This institutional setup clearly facilitates ex-post discrimination, as governments can choose not
to pay foreign banks without interfering with domestic asset trade.” During the 1990s, instead,
many governments in emerging markets started to issue debt in the form of anonymous bonds,
which are highly traded in secondary markets. In these economies, governments usually fail to
keep track of the large volumes of transaction in public bond secondary market and end up with
almost no information of the ultimate holders of debt (Panizza (2008)). Finally, notice that the
effect captured by coefficient β1 is also economically significant, as it implies that, in the first year
of a default episode, the level of output in the most financially dependent sector (Transportation
equipment) is roughly a 27 percent lower than the output in the least financially dependent one
(Tobacco), after controlling for additional industry characteristics.
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Finally, I inspect whether the effect of default on different industries is persistent over time
by adding up to 2 lags of for interaction terms between the default indicator and each industry
characteristics to the baseline specification (24). The results are reported in table 3. In particular,
the results obtained suggest that the disproportional effect of sovereign default on financially
dependent industries decays very rapidly, as the coefficient on the lagged interaction terms are
never statistically significant.
In conclusion, the evidence show that default episodes are associated with a disproportional
output contraction in industries that rely extensively on external sources of finance. In particular,
there is no significant evidence suggesting that sovereign default determines a decline in industries
where the demand for external finance is specifically targeted to the very short-term. Yet, while
the theoretical model suggests that sovereign default might be connected with a widespread
credit crunch within the economy, it does not univocally predict whether the consequences of
default are different between industries with short or medium term liquidity needs.
6 Conclusion
Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with financial turmoil and
liquidity crises throughout the economy. This connection is suggested by both anecdotical and
empirical evidence. In particular, defaults episodes appear to lead banking crises. However, there
is no clear evidence supporting the application of foreign penalties when default occurs.
This paper then proposes a novel mechanism linking sovereign defaults with liquidity and banking
crises without any intervention of foreign creditors. The model considers a standard unwillingness-
to-pay problem assuming that: (i) the enforcement of private contracts is limited and, as a result,
public debt represents a source of liquidity; (ii) the government cannot discriminate between do-
mestic and foreign agents. The model shows that external debt might emerge even in absence of
classic penalties imposed by foreign creditors. Indeed, the prospect of triggering a liquidity crisis
throughout the economy restores the ex-post incentive to pay of the government. Nonetheless,
liquidity crises might arise when economic conditions deteriorate and the government chooses
opportunistically to default in order to avoid the repayment of foreign agents.
This paper then contributes to a recent strand of the sovereign debt literature that focuses on
the direct consequences of sovereign default on the domestic economy, most notably Broner
and Ventura (2006). Yet, the mechanism and, thereby the consequences arising in the event of
default, differ from the one highlighted by these authors. In their setup, a sovereign default leads
to an undesirable redistribution of resources within the economy. In my model, instead, sovereign
default leads to a disruption of private investment. Along different lines, these two papers suggest
a remarkable policy implication: as they show that the source of the costs associated with default
is to be looked for in the direct consequences on the domestic private sector and not in foreign
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penalties, these papers provide a theoretical underpinning for crises resolution policies that refuse
to sacrifice domestic claims to service external debt.
Finally, this paper provides a fully-fledged framework to think about domestic legal and in-
stitutional reforms. Different types of reforms are considered and, for each one of them, the
implications on international capital flows are remarked. In particular, the model shows that
government’s incentive to undertake a legal reform is positively related to the average return on
private investment and negatively to the return on public investment. The paper then suggests a
possible explanation for cross-country and cross-time variation in legal institutions which differs
from studies stressing political economy issues.
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A A snapshot of the Argentine crisis
After being almost fatally wounded by the shock wave of the Mexican Tequila Crisis in 1994-1995,
the Argentinean banking system was deeply reformed by the introduction of a new regulatory
regime, called BASIC, designed following the international standards in the Basel Accord. As
reported by Mishkin (2006) in his recent book The Next Great Globalization, the reform was
instigated by concerns raised by depositors’ run on domestic banks and the consequent decline
in bank lending to non-financial companies which drove the Argentine economy into a recession.
The new regime had “strict liquidity requirements, which required banks to hold 20% of short-
term deposits in safe and liquid assets”. Though, from the Basel Accord it inherited “a weighting
scheme for measuring bank risk according to which government bonds were classified as being the
least risky of all assets that a bank could hold” designed to fit advanced countries better than
emerging markets. Thus, at the outset of the 2001 crisis Argentine banks were already major
holders of government debt and the banks’ exposure grew further when the limits on the share
of government bonds in bank reserves were lifted to allow the central government to collocate
additional debt: “the banks went along because, with their high interest rates, the bonds would be
very profitable if the government avoided default”. By then, the stability of the banking system
was compromised. When the government announced a temporary suspension of debt payments
and, soon after, abandoned the currency board, most firms were declared insolvent on their dollar-
denominated debts and the strength of bank balance sheets was seriously undermined by large
losses in both the defaulted government debt and private loans. That precarious situation was
further exacerbated by the subsequent asymmetric pesofication of bank loans and deposits. With
banks not granting new loans, businesses dramatically cut back on their spending, aggravating
further the economic downturn. While the trigger of the Argentine debt crisis is arguably in four
external shocks (namely, the appreciation of the US dollar, the decline in the terms of trade, the
Russian crisis and the Brazilian exchange rate crisis), Mishkin’s analysis shows that the cost of
the government’s default was substantially magnified by the destabilization of the internal credit
market.
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B Theoretical appendix
B.1 Precautionary savings and equity markets.
This section shows formally how the lack of collateral causes an under-supply of private equities
in the economy and thereby limits the ability of firms to save the optimal amount of resources.
Instead the government intervention, by committing workers’ income via taxation, adds to private
collateral and expands the supply of securities in the economy.
Let yγ = γ
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ} pi(θs)
[
θs
Ak + ak + (A−a) i
2
]
denote the maximum number of equities that
each entrepreneur can issue at date 0. Each equity assigns to its holder an ownership right on
one unit of the expected production (or equivalently a unit share of production in each state).
Given that agents are risk neutral, the price of each equity is then equal to one. In order to
finance the initial investment the entrepreneur issues a quantity α yγ = k of equities to foreign
investors. Then, he trades the remaining quantity bp = (1 − α) yγ to constitute a portfolio of
private equities issued by other firms. Indeed, although the entrepreneur is risk-neutral, he wants
to diversify among all firms’ equities in order to maximize the value of his portfolio at date 1 and
therefore increase the additional reinvestment in his own project. Using symmetry, the value of
market portfolio is equal to bp. Let
yl(θs) = θsAk + bp and yu(θs) = θs (ak + (A− a) i) + bp − i
denote the entrepreneur’s final output when he has been lucky or unlucky, and includes the
private asset holding bp ≥ 0. The problem of the representative entrepreneur is then,
Π = max
k,bp
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs) − rl(θs) (k+bp)
2 +
yu(θs) − ru(θs) (k+bp)
2
]
(25)
where rl(θs) (k + bp) and ru(θs) (k + bp) denote the dividends paid, respectively, by lucky and
unlucky entrepreneurs, which are subject to the collateral constraints,
rl(θs)
(
k + bp
) ≤ γ yl(θs) and ru(θs) (k + bp) ≤ γ yu(θs) (26)
and must satisfy the non-negative profit constraint on IFM’s loans,∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
rl(θs)+ru(θs)
2
]
≥ 1. (27)
In addition, the entrepreneur’s problem is subject to the constraint on the maximum number of
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equities that can be issued at date 0, that is
k + bp ≤ yγ . (28)
After substituting (26) into (27) and considering that constraint (27) must be binding in equilib-
rium, the entrepreneur’s problem consists in maximizing (25) subject to (28) and the following
constraint,
k + bp ≤ γ
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs) + yu(θs)
2
]
. (29)
Given that bp > 0, in equilibrium yγ < γ
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ} pi(θs)
[
yl(θs) + yu(θs)
2
]
. Therefore, constraint
(29) is never binding in equilibrium and can be omitted. Notice now that the entrepreneur’s
problem is very similar to problem (3)-(5). It is however subject to a more stringent constraint,
i.e. (28). In conclusion, the analysis of this section shows that, when domestic firms save in
private equities, they are not able to get the same revenues that they would obtain when they
can save in the government bonds. As this follows from the inclusion of constraint (28) in the
entrepreneur’s problem, this result depends on a shortage of aggregate collateral which generates
an under-supply of private securities.
B.2 Sovereign risk and risk aversion
Suppose that domestic firms are risk-averse and the IFM is risk neutral. Let U define the utility
function (over private consumption) of domestic entrepreneurs, where
U =
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
u
(
cl(θs, e)
)
+ u
(
cu(θs, e)
)
2
, (30)
where u(·) is increasing and concave, cl(θs, e) = yl(θs, e)−rl(θs)(k+ b+f) denotes the consump-
tion of lucky entrepreneurs for each realization of θs, cu(θs, e) = yu(θs, e) − ru(θs)(k + b + f)
denotes the consumption of lucky entrepreneurs, yl(θs, e) and yu(θs, e) are defined as in (13),
and ∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
rl(θs) + ru(θs)
2
]
≥ 1, (31)
given that the IFM is risk-neutral and competitive. Then, the problem of the representative
entrepreneur is defined by the maximization of (30), subject to (31) and the borrowing con-
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straint,
rl(θs)
(
k + b+ f
) ≤ γ yl(θs) and ru(θs) (k + b+ f) ≤ γ yu(θs). (32)
Given that constraint (31) is binding in equilibrium, the above program can be solved by maxi-
mizing the following Lagrangean,
L =
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
u
(
cl(θs, e)
)
+ u
(
cu(θs, e)
)
2
+
+ ν
γ ∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ}
pi(θs)
[
yl(θs, e) + yu(θs, e)
2
]
− (k + b+ f)
 .
Notice, first, that the optimal initial investment k is still equal to k¯. Indeed, as initial investment
is, by construction, profitable for both the entrepreneur and the IFM, the entrepreneur, by
investing up to k¯, can increase both his expected utility and he can relax the borrowing constraint
(32). That is, he faces no trade-off when choosing the initial investment k. Let’s, then, focus
exclusively on the first order conditions with respect to b and f , which are respectively:
pi(θ¯)
2
“
ρ− rl(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cl(θ¯, 1)
”
+
“
ρθ¯(A− a)− ru(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cu(θ¯, 1)
”ff
− (33)
− pi(θ)
2

rl(θ)u
′“
cl(θ, 0)
”
+ ru(θ)u
′“
cu(θ, 0)
”ff
+ λ
„
1 + θ¯(A− a)
2
− 1
«
= 0,
pi(θ¯)
2
“
1− rl(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cl(θ¯, 1)
”
+
“
θ¯(A− a)− ru(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cu(θ¯, 1)
”ff
− (34)
+
pi(θ)
2
“
1− rl(θ)
”
u
′“
cl(θ, 0)
”
+
“
θ(A− a)− ru(θ)
”
u
′“
cu(θ, 0)
”ff
+ λ
„
1 + (A− a)
2
− 1
«
= 0.
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Let’s rearrange the above conditions as follows:
pi(θ¯)
2
“
1− rl(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cl(θ¯, 1)
”
+
“
θ¯(A− a)− ru(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cu(θ¯, 1)
”ff
− pi(θ)
2

rl(θ)u
′“
cl(θ, 0)
”
+ ru(θ)u
′“
cu(θ, 0)
”ff
+
(35)
+
1− pi(θ¯)
2

u
′“
cl(θ¯, 1)
”
+ θ¯(A− a)u′
“
cu(θ¯, 1)
”ff
+ λ
„
1 + θ¯(A− a)
2
− 1
«
= 0,
pi(θ¯)
2
“
1− rl(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cl(θ¯, 1)
”
+
“
θ¯(A− a)− ru(θ¯)
”
u
′“
cu(θ¯, 1)
”ff
− pi(θ)
2

rl(θ)u
′“
cl(θ, 0)
”
+ ru(θ)u
′“
cu(θ, 0)
”ff
+
(36)
+
pi(θ)
2

u
′“
cl(θ, 1)
”
+ θ(A− a)u′
“
cu(θ, 1)
”ff
+ λ
„
1 + (A− a)
2
− 1
«
= 0,
Notice now that the first rows of equation (35) and (36) are identical and let κ denote their
value. In addition, recall that 1−pi(θ¯) = pi(θ). Finally, the representative entrepreneur’s problem
admits an interior solution for b and f , i.e. b ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0, provided the following condition is
satisfied:
κ+ pi(θ)2
{
u′
(
cl(θ¯, 1)
)
+ θ¯(A− a)u′
(
cu(θ¯, 1)
)}
κ+ pi(θ)2
{
u′
(
cl(θ, 1)
)
+ θ(A− a)u′
(
cu(θ, 1)
)} = 1+θ¯(A−a)2 − 11+(A−a)
2 − 1
(37)
On the contrary, when the left hand side of (37) exceeds the right hand side, b > 0 and f = 0,
and viceversa. Notice now that the left hand side is decreasing in the degree of concavity of the
function u(·), or the degree of risk aversion of domestic entrepreneurs. Given that the left hand
side is strictly greater than the right hand side (so b > 0 and f = 0 as showed in the main text),
there exists at least one concave utility function such that the left hand side is strictly greater
than the right hand side and the entrepreneur chooses to save in the procyclical government bond,
despite being risk averse. Nonetheless, as the degree of risk aversion of domestic entrepreneurs
increases, the optimal saving choice of domestic firms would involve only the purchase of foreign
riskless bonds.
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C Data Description
Log Value Added (y). Log of value added in US dollars at the 3-digit ISIC classification
for manufacturing sectors. Data are sourced from the UNIDO INDSTAT 2005 database. Orig-
inal data are deflated using the GDP deflator in United States from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators 2006 CD-ROM.
Default Dummy (DEF ). Dummy variable taking a value one in the first year of a default
episode. Data on default episodes are sourced from the Standard and Poor’s sovereign default
database, as reported in Beers and Chambers (2002). This database includes all sovereign de-
faults on loans or bonds with private agents between 1975 and 2002, and reports the period
during which the debtor government remained in default.
Financial Dependence (FinDep). An index constructed as the median share of capital
expenditures not financed with the cash flow from operations (capital expenditures minus cash
flow from operation divided by capital expenditures) by US-based, publicly listed firms. The
index is sourced from Kroszner et al. (2007), who provide a 3-digit ISIC based reclassification of
the data originally constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a mixture of 3-digit and 4-digit
ISIC sectors. The data refer to the period 1980-1999 and, originally, range from -1.14 (Tobacco)
to 0.72 (Transport equipment), with a higher number indicating greater financial dependence.
To ease statical inference, I normalize the index such that it ranges from 0 to 1.
Liquidity Needs (Liq). An index constructed as the median ratio of inventories over total
sales for US-based, publicly listed firms. This index has been initially proposed by Raddatz
(2006) to measure industrys financial needs that focuses on short-term liquidity needs. The data
are sourced from Kroszner et al. (2007), who compute the Raddatz index for the 3-digit ISIC
manufacturing sectors. The data refer to the 1980s and, originally, range from 0.07 (Tobacco) to
0.72 (Plastic Products), with a higher number indicating greater financial dependence. To ease
statical inference, I normalize the index such that it ranges from 0 to 1.
Tangibility (Tangs). An index constructed as the median ratio of net property, plant and
equipment to total assets by US-publicly listed firms during the period 1980-1999 in each 3-digit
ISIC manufacturing sector. The data are sourced from Kroszner et al. (2007). The original data
range from 0.12 to 0.62, and are normalized such that they range from 0 to 1.
ExpOrs,c. An index of export orientation computed as the average share of exports over total
sales for each industry in each country included in the sample. The data source used to construct
the export orientation index is Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), who report export and import values
for each ISIC industry.
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C.1 Deletion criteria
First, I delete all observations for which the data for value added are either missing or negative.
Second, given that the initial panel is unbalanced, I remove all sector-country-year observations
with data for less than 5 years. This reduces the within estimator’s sensitivity to isolated
observations in the panel. Third, I exclude all country-year pairs reporting data for less than 10
sectors, in order to guarantee sufficient within country-year variation in the interaction between
financial dependence and default (captured by the coefficient β1). The same criterium is applied
in Borensztein and Panizza (2006). Fourth, I drop those observations for which the growth rate
of value added fall in the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution. This is a common strategy
in order to limit the noise created by outliers.
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Table 1: Default episodes in the sample
Country Default year
Argentina 1989
Bolivia 1986
Bolivia 1989
Chile 1983
Costa Rica 1981
Costa Rica 1984
Cuba 1982
Dominican Republic 1981
Ecuador 1982
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1984
El Salvador 1981
Ghana 1987
Guatemala 1986
Honduras 1981
Jamaica 1981
Jamaica 1987
Jordan 1989
Kuwait 1990
Madagascar 1981
Madagascar 1986
Malawi 1982
Mexico 1982
Morocco 1986
Nigeria 1982
Panama 1983
Panama 1987
Peru 1983
Philippines 1983
Poland 1981
Senegal 1981
Senegal 1990
Serbia and Montenegro 1983
South Africa 1985
South Africa 1989
Tanzania 1984
Turkey 1982
Uruguay 1983
Uruguay 1987
Uruguay 1990
Venezuela, RB 1983
Venezuela, RB 1990
Table 2: Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1980-1990 1980-1990 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990-2002
ys,c,t−1 0.373*** 0.375*** 0.455*** 0.454*** 0.483***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055)
DEFc,t · FinDeps -0.094 -0.097 -0.208* -0.196* -0.275*
(0.070) (0.071) (0.117) (0.117) (0.148)
DEFc,t · Liqs -0.092* -0.069 -0.053 -0.126 -0.093
(0.052) (0.069) (0.088) (0.115) (0.125)
DEFc,t · Tangs 0.033 -0.115 -0.044
(0.065) (0.116) (0.143)
DEFc,t · ExpOrs,c -0.078
(0.160)
1st autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2nd autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.27
Sargan test 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.12
Obs. 15406 15406 15605 15605 12828
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The table reports the one-
step first-differenced GMM estimator for the main specifications for the 1980-1990 and the
1990-2002 samples. The set of instruments includes the first lag of the lagged dependent
variable. Country-time effects are removed by country-time differencing prior to estimation.
Sector-country fixed effects are removed by first differencing. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported within parenthesis. 1st autocorr. and 2nd autocorr. are auto-
correlation tests on the estimation residuals. p-values for the asymptotic N(0, 1) distribution
are reported. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is based on a two-step GMM
estimation. p-values for the asymptotic χ2 distribution are reported.
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Table 3: Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1980-1990 1980-1990 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990-2002
ys,c,t−1 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.450*** 0.451*** 0.480***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055)
DEFc,t · FinDeps -0.094 -0.097 -0.225** -0.213* -0.303**
(0.069) (0.070) (0.113) (0.113) (0.140)
DEFc,t−1 · FinDeps 0.102* 0.100* 0.086 0.077 0.163
(0.061) (0.061) (0.115) (0.116) (0.148)
DEFc,t−2 · FinDeps -0.127* -0.120* 0.099 0.097 0.116
(0.072) (0.072) (0.097) (0.097) (0.109)
DEFc,t · Liqs -0.096* -0.076 -0.050 -0.122 -0.091
(0.051) (0.067) (0.085) (0.112) (0.123)
DEFc,t−1 · Liqs 0.002 0.015 -0.020 0.037 0.056
(0.049) (0.067) (0.085) (0.097) (0.106)
DEFc,t−2 · Liqs -0.085 -0.131* -0.002 0.007 0.015
(0.055) (0.078) (0.077) (0.104) (0.106)
DEFc,t · Tangs 0.030 -0.112 -0.033
(0.064) (0.114) (0.141)
DEFc,t−1 · Tangs 0.019 0.087 0.059
(0.063) (0.101) (0.114)
DEFc,t−2 · Tangs -0.068 0.013 -0.011
(0.071) (0.097) (0.102)
DEFc,t · ExpOrs,c -0.051
(0.155)
DEFc,t−1 · ExpOrs,c -0.019
(0.143)
DEFc,t−1 · ExpOrs,c -0.081
(0.117)
1st autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2nd autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.53 0.26
Sargan test 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.22 0.13
Obs. 15406 15406 15605 15605 12828
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The table reports the one-
step first-differenced GMM estimator for the main specifications for the 1980-1990 and the
1990-2002 samples. The set of instruments includes the first lag of the lagged dependent
variable. Country-time effects are removed by country-time differencing prior to estimation.
Sector-country fixed effects are removed by first differencing. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported within parenthesis. 1st autocorr. and 2nd autocorr. are auto-
correlation tests on the estimation residuals. p-values for the asymptotic N(0, 1) distribution
are reported. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is based on a two-step GMM
estimation. p-values for the asymptotic χ2 distribution are reported.
